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Abstract
In this paper, we address the problem of privacy-preserving training and evaluation of neural networks in anN-party, federated learning setting.
We propose a novel system, POSEIDON, the first of its kind in the regime of privacy-preserving neural network training, employing multiparty
lattice-based cryptography and preserving the confidentiality of the training data, the model, and the evaluation data, under a passive-adversary model
and collusions between up toN−1 parties. To efficiently execute the secure backpropagation algorithm for training neural networks, we provide
a generic packing approach that enables Single Instruction, Multiple Data (SIMD) operations on encrypted data. We also introduce arbitrary linear
transformations within the cryptographic bootstrapping operation, optimizing the costly cryptographic computations over the parties, and we define a
constrained optimization problem for choosing the cryptographic parameters. Our experimental results show that POSEIDON achieves accuracy similar
to centralized or decentralized non-private approaches and that its computation and communication overhead scales linearly with the number of parties.
POSEIDON trains a 3-layer neural network on the MNIST dataset with 784 features and 60K samples distributed among 10 parties in less than 2 hours.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the era of big data and machine learning, neural networks (NNs) are the state-of-the-art models, as they achieve remarkable predictive
performance in various domains such as healthcare, finance, and image recognition [11], [75], [104]. However, training an accurate and robust
deep learning model requires a large amount of diverse and heterogeneous data [118]. This phenomenon raises the need for data sharing among
multiple data owners who wish to collectively train a deep learning model and to extract valuable and generalizable insights from their joint
data. Nonetheless, data sharing among entities, such as medical institutions, companies, and organizations, is often not feasible due to the sensitive
nature of the data [115], strict privacy regulations [2], [8] or the business competition between them [102]. Therefore, solutions that enable
privacy-preserving training of NNs on the data of multiple parties are highly desirable in many domains.
A simple solution for collective training is to outsource the data of multiple parties to a trusted party that is able to train the neural network
(NN) model on their behalf and to retain the data and model’s confidentiality, based on established stringent non-disclosure agreements. These
confidentiality agreements, however, require a significant amount of time to be prepared by legal and technical teams [70] and are very costly [60].
Furthermore, the trusted party might become a single point of failure, thus both data and model privacy could be compromised by data breaches,
hacking, leaks, etc. Hence, technical solutions originating from the cryptographic community aim to replace and emulate the trusted party
with a group of computing servers. In particular, to enable privacy-preserving training of NNs, several studies employ multiparty computation
(MPC) techniques and operate on the two [81], [28], three [80], [108], [109], or four [27], [93] server models. Such approaches, however, limit
the number of parties among which the trust is split, often assume an honest majority among the computing servers, and require parties to
communicate (i.e., secret share) their data outside their premises. This might not be acceptable due to the privacy and confidentiality requirements
and the strict data protection regulations. Furthermore, the computing servers do not operate on their own data or benefit from the model training;
hence, they do not have an incentive to perform the required computations, which increases the possibility of malicious behaviour.
A recently proposed alternative for privacy-preserving training of NNs – without data outsourcing – is federated learning. Instead of bringing
the data to the model, the model is brought (via a coordinating server) to the clients, who perform model updates on their local data. The updated
models from multiple parties are averaged to obtain the global NN model [73], [64]. Although federated learning retains locally the sensitive input
data and eliminates the need for data outsourcing, the model, that might also be sensitive, e.g., due to proprietary reasons, becomes available to the
coordinating server, thus placing the latter in a position of power with respect to the remaining parties. Recent research demonstrates that sharing
intermediate model updates among the parties or with the server might lead to various privacy attacks, such as extracting parties’ inputs [53],
[111], [117] or membership inference [76], [84]. Consequently, several works employ differential privacy to enable privacy-preserving exchanges
of intermediate values and to obtain models that are free from adversarial inferences in federated learning settings [66], [99], [74]. Although
differentially private techniques partially limit attacks to federated learning, they decrease the utility of the data and the resulting machine
learning model. Furthermore, training robust and accurate models requires high privacy budgets, and as such, the level of privacy achieved in
practice remains unclear [55]. Therefore, a distributed privacy-preserving deep learning approach requires strong cryptographic protection of
the intermediate model updates during the training process, as well as of the final model weights.
Recent cryptographic approaches for private distributed learning, e.g., [116], [42], not only have limited machine learning functionalities,
i.e., regularized or generalized linear models, but also employ traditional encryption schemes that make them vulnerable to post-quantum attacks.
This should be cautiously considered, as recent advances in quantum computing [7], [46], [85], [103], [114], increase the need for deploying
quantum-resilient cryptographic schemes that eliminate potential risks for applications with long-term sensitive data. Froelicher et al. recently
proposed SPINDLE [41], a generic approach for the privacy-preserving training of machine learning models in anN-party setting that employs
multiparty lattice-based cryptography, thus achieving post-quantum security guarantees. However, the authors [41] demonstrate the applicability
of their approach only for generalized linear models, and their solution lacks the necessary protocols and functions that can support the training
of complex machine learning models, such as NNs.
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
9.
00
34
9v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
 Se
p 2
02
0
In this work, we extend the approach of SPINDLE [41] and build POSEIDON, a novel system that enables the training and evaluation of
NNs in a distributed setting and provides end-to-end protection of the parties’ training data, the resulting model, and the evaluation data. Using
multiparty lattice-based homomorphic encryption [82], POSEIDON enables NN executions with different types of layers, such as fully connected,
convolution, and pooling, on a dataset that is distributed amongN parties that need to trust only themselves for the confidentiality of their data
and of the resulting model. POSEIDON relies on mini-batch gradient descent and protects, from any party, the intermediate updates of the NN
model by maintaining the weights and gradients encrypted throughout the training phase. POSEIDON also enables the resulting encrypted model
to be used for privacy-preserving inference on encrypted evaluation data.
We evaluate POSEIDON on several real-world and publicly available datasets and observe that it achieves training accuracy levels on par
with centralized or decentralized non-private approaches. Regarding its execution time, we find that POSEIDON trains a 2-layer NN model on
a dataset with 23 features and 30,000 samples distributed among 10 parties, in 8.7 minutes. In a similar setting, POSEIDON trains a 3-layer
NN with 64 neurons in each hidden-layer on the MNIST dataset [65] with 784 features and 60K samples shared between 10 parties, in 1.4
hours. Finally, our scalability analysis shows that POSEIDON’s computation and communication overhead scales linearly with the number of
parties and logarithmically with the number of features or the number of neurons in each layer.
In this work, we make the following contributions:
• We present POSEIDON, a novel system for privacy-preserving, quantum-resistant, federated learning-based training of and inference on
neural networks withN parties with unboundedN ; that relies on multiparty homomorphic encryption and respects the confidentiality
of the training data, the model, and the evaluation data.
• We propose the alternating packing approach for the efficient use of single instruction, multiple data (SIMD) operations on encrypted data,
and we provide a generic protocol for executing neural networks under encryption, depending on the size of the dataset and the structure
of the network.
• We improve the distributed bootstrapping protocol of [82] by introducing arbitrary linear transformations for optimizing computationally
heavy operations, such as pooling or a large number of consecutive rotations on ciphertexts.
• We formulate a constrained optimization problem for choosing the cryptographic parameters and for balancing the number of costly
cryptographic operations required for training and evaluating neural networks in a distributed setting.
• POSEIDON advances the state-of-the-art privacy-preserving solutions for NNs based on MPC [108], [81], [80], [13], [93], [109], by
achieving better flexibility, security, and scalability:
Flexibility. POSEIDON relies on a federated learning approach, thus eliminates the need for communicating the parties’ confidential
data outside their premises which might not be always feasible due to privacy regulations [2], [8]. This is in contrast to MPC-based
solutions which require parties to distribute their data among several servers, and thus, fall under the cloud outsourcing model.
Security. POSEIDON splits the trust among multiple parties, and guarantees its data and model confidentiality properties under a
passive-adversarial model and collusions between up toN−1 parties, for unboundedN . On the contrary, MPC-based solutions limit
the number of parties among which the trust is split (typically, 2, 3, or 4-servers) and assume an honest majority among them.
Scalability. POSEIDON’s communication overhead scales linearly with the number of parties, whereas MPC-based solutions scale
quadratically.
• Unlike differential privacy-based approaches for federated learning [66], [99], [74], POSEIDON does not degrade the utility of the data,
and the impact on the model’s accuracy is negligible.
To the best of our knowledge, POSEIDON is the first system that enables quantum-resilient, distributed learning on neural networks with N
parties in a federated learning setting, and that preserves the privacy of the parties’ confidential data, the intermediate model updates, and the
final model weights.
II. RELATED WORK
Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning (PPML). Previous PPML works focus exclusively on the training of (generalized) linear models [19],
[57], [25], [34], [48], [61], [62]. They rely on centralized solutions where the learning task is securely outsourced to a server, notably using
homomorphic encryption (HE) techniques. As such, these works do not solve the problem of privacy-preserving distributed machine learning,
where multiple parties collaboratively train a machine learning model on their data. To address the latter, several works propose multi-party
computation (MPC) solutions where learning tasks, such as clustering and regression, are distributed among 2 or 3 servers [54], [26], [86], [43],
[44], [14], [98], [23], [31]. Although such solutions enable multiple parties to collaboratively train ML models on their data, the trust distribution is
limited to the number of computing servers that train the model, and they rely on assumptions such as non-collusion, or an honest majority among
the servers. There exist only a few works that extend the distribution of machine learning computations toN−parties (N≥4) and that remove
the need for outsourcing [33], [116], [42], [41]. For instance, Zheng et al. propose Helen, a system for privacy-preserving learning of linear
models that combines HE with MPC techniques [116]. However, the use of the Paillier additive HE scheme [87] makes their system vulnerable
to post-quantum attacks. To this end, Froelicher et al. introduce SPINDLE [41], a system that provides support for generalized linear models
and security against post-quantum attacks. These works have paved the way for privacy-preserving machine learning computations in the N-party
setting, but none of them addresses the challenges associated with the privacy-preserving training of and the inference on neural networks (NNs).
Privacy-Preserving Inference on Neural Networks. In this research direction, the majority of works operate on the following setting: a central
server holds a trained neural network model and clients communicate their evaluation data to obtain predictions-as-a-service [37], [71], [59]. Their
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aim is to protect both the confidentiality of the server’s model and the clients’ data. Dowlin et al. propose the use of a ring-based leveled HE scheme
to enable the inference phase on encrypted data [37]. Other works rely on hybrid approaches by employing two-party computation (2PC) and
HE [59], [71], or secret sharing and garbled circuits to enable privacy-preserving inference on NNs [89], [95], [79]. For instance, Riazi et al. use
garbled circuits to achieve constant round communication complexity during the evaluation of binary neural networks [95], whereas Mishra et al.
propose a similar hybrid solution that outperforms previous works in terms of efficiency, by tolerating a small decrease in the model’s accuracy [79].
Boemer et al. develop a deep-learning graph compiler for multiple HE cryptographic libraries [21], [22], such as SEAL [1], HElib [49], and
Palisade [96]. Their work enables the deployment of a model, which is trained with well-known frameworks (e.g., Tensorflow [9], PyTorch [88]),
and enables predictions on encrypted data. Dalskov et al. use quantization techniques to enable efficient privacy-preserving inference on models
trained with Tensorflow [9] by using MP-SPDZ [5] and demonstrate benchmarks for a wide range of adversarial models [35].
All aforementioned solutions enable only privacy-preserving inference on neural networks, whereas our work focuses on both the privacy-
preserving training of and the inference on NNs, protecting the training data, the resulting model, and the evaluation data.
Privacy-Preserving Training of Neural Networks. A number of works focus on centralized solutions to enable privacy-preserving learning of
NNs [101], [10], [113], [107], [83], [51]. Some of them, e.g., [101], [10], [113], employ differentially private techniques to execute the stochastic
gradient descent while training a NN in order to derive models that are protected from inference attacks [100]. However, they assume that the
training data is available to a trusted party that applies the noise required during the training steps. Other works, e.g., [107], [83], [51], rely
on HE to outsource the training of multi-layer perceptrons to a central server. These solutions either employ cryptographic parameters that are
far from realistic [107], [83], or yield impractical performance [51]. Furthermore, they do not support the training of NNs in theN-party setting,
which is the main focus of our work.
A number of works that enable privacy-preserving distributed learning of NNs employ MPC approaches where the parties’ confidential data
is distributed among two [81], [13], three [80], [108], [109], [52], [28], or four servers [27], [93] (2PC, 3PC, and 4PC, resp.). For instance, in
the 2PC setting, Mohassel and Zhang describe a system where data owners process and secret-share their data among two non-colluding servers
to train various machine learning models [81], and Agrawal et al. propose a framework that supports discretized training of NNs by ternarizing
the weights [13]. Then, Mohassel and Rindal extend [81] to the 3PC setting and introduce new fixed-point multiplication protocols for shared
decimal numbers [80]. Wagh et al. further improve the efficiency of privacy-preserving NN training on secret-shared data [108] and provide
security against malicious adversaries, assuming an honest majority among 3 servers [109]. More recently, 4PC, honest-majority malicious
frameworks for privacy-preserving machine learning have been proposed [27], [93]. These works split the trust between more servers and achieve
better round complexities than previous ones, yet they do not address NN training amongN-parties. Note that 2PC, 3PC, and 4PC solutions
fall under the cloud outsourcing model, as the data of the parties has to be transferred to several servers among which the majority has to be
trusted. Our work, however, focuses on a distributed setting where the data owners maintain their data locally and iteratively update the collective
model, yet data and model confidentiality is ensured in the existence of a dishonest majority in a semi-honest setting, thus withstanding passive
adversaries and up toN−1 collusions between them. We provide a qualitative comparison with these works in Appendix B.
Another widely employed approach for training NNs in a distributed manner is that of federated learning [73], [63], [64]. The main idea is to
train a global model on data that is distributed across multiple clients, with the assistance of a server that coordinates model updates on each client
and averages them. Although this approach does not require clients to send their local data to the central server, several works show that the clients’
model updates leak information about their local data [91]. To counter this, some works focus on secure aggregation techniques for distributed
NNs, based on HE [90], [91] or MPC [24]. Although encrypting the gradient values prevents the leakage of parties’ confidential data to the central
server, these solutions do not account for potential leakage from the aggregate values themselves. In particular, parties that decrypt the received
model before the next iteration are able to infer information about other parties’ data from its parameters [53], [76], [84], [117]. Another line
of research relies on differential privacy (DP) to enable privacy-preserving federated learning for NNs. Shokri and Shmatikov [99] apply DP to the
parameter update stages, and Li et al. design a privacy-preserving federated learning system for medical image analysis where the parties exchange
differentially private gradients [66]. McMahan et al. propose differentially private federated learning [74], by employing the moments accountant
method [10], to protect the privacy of all the records belonging to a user. Finally, other works combine MPC with DP techniques to achieve better
privacy guarantees [56], [106]. While DP-based learning aims to mitigate inference attacks, it significantly degrades model utility, as training
accurate NN models requires high privacy budgets [94]. As such, it is hard to quantify the level of privacy protection that can be achieved with
these approaches [55]. To account for these issues, our work employs multiparty homomorphic encryption techniques to achieve zero-leakage
training of neural networks in a distributed setting where the parties’ intermediate updates and the final model remain under encryption.
III. PRELIMINARIES
We introduce here the background information about NNs as well as the multiparty homomorphic encryption (MHE) scheme on which
POSEIDON relies to achieve privacy-preserving training of and inference on NN models in a federatedN-party setting.
A. Neural Networks
Neural networks (NNs) are machine learning algorithms that extract complex non-linear relationships between the input and output data.
They are used in a wide range of fields such as pattern recognition, data/image analysis, face recognition, forecasting, and data validation in
the medicine, banking, finance, marketing, and health industries [11]. Typical NNs are composed of a pipeline of layers where feed-forward
and backpropagation steps for linear and non-linear transformations (activations) are applied to the input data iteratively [47]. Each training
iteration is composed of one forward pass and one backward pass, and the term epoch refers to processing once all the samples in a dataset.
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Multilayer perceptrons (MLPs) are fully-connected deep neural network structures which are widely used in the industry, e.g., they constitute
61% of Tensor Processing Units’ workload in Google’s datacenters [58]. MLPs are composed of an input layer, one or more hidden layer(s),
as well as an output layer, and each neuron is connected to all the neurons in the following layer. At iteration k, the weights between layers
j and j+1, are denoted by a matrix Wkj , whereas the matrix Lj represents the activation of the neurons in the j
th layer. The forward pass
requires first the linear combination of each layer’s weights with the activation values of the previous layer, i.e., Uj=Wkj ×Lj−1. Then, an
activation function is applied to calculate the values of each layer as Lj=ϕ(Uj).
Backpropagation, a method based on gradient descent, is then used to update the weights during the backward pass. Here, we describe the
update rules for mini-batch gradient descent where a random batch of sample inputs of sizeB is used in each iteration. The aim is to minimize
each iteration’s error based on a cost functionE (e.g., mean squared error) and update the weights accordingly. The update rule isWk+1j =W
k
j −
η
B∇Wkj , where η is the learning rate and∇Wkj denotes the gradient of the cost function with respect to the weights and calculated as∇Wkj = ∂E∂Wkj .
We note that backpropagation requires several transpose operations applied to matrices/vectors and we denote transpose of a matrix/vector asWT .
Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) follow a very similar sequence of operations, i.e., forward and backpropagation passes, and typically
consist of convolutional (CV), pooling, and fully connected (FC) layers. It is worth mentioning that CV layer operations can be expressed
as FC layer operations by representing them as matrix multiplications; in our protocols, we simplify CV layer operations by employing this
representation [108], [3]. Finally, pooling layers are downsampling layers where a kernel, i.e., a matrix that moves over the input matrix with
a stride of a, is convoluted with the current sub-matrix. For a kernel of size k×k, the minimum, maximum, or average (depending on the pooling
type) of each k×k sub-matrix of the layer’s input is computed.
B. Distributed Deep Learning
We employ the well-known MapReduce abstraction to describe the training of data-parallel NNs in a distributed setting where multiple data
providers hold their respective datasets [119], [32]. We rely on a variant of the parallel stochastic gradient descent (SGD) [119] algorithm, where
each party performs b local iterations and calculates each layer’s partial gradients. These gradients are aggregated over all parties and the reducer
performs the model update with the average of gradients [32]. This process is repeated form global iterations. Note that averaging the gradients
fromN parties is equivalent to performing batch gradient descent with a batch size of b×N . Thus, we differentiate between the local batch
size as b and the global batch sizeB=b×N .
C. Multiparty Homomorphic Encryption (MHE)
In our system, we rely on the Cheon-Kim-Kim-Song (CKKS) [29] variant of the MHE scheme proposed by Mouchet et al. [82]. In this scheme,
a public collective key is known by all parties while the corresponding secret key is distributed among them. As such, decryption is only possible
with the participation of all parties. Our motivations for choosing this scheme are: (i) It is well suited for floating point arithmetic, (ii) it is based
on the ring learning with errors (RLWE) problem [72], making our system secure against post-quantum attacks [12], (iii) it enables secure and
flexible collaborative computations between parties without sharing their respective secret key, and (iv) it enables a secure collective key-switch
functionality, that is, changing the encryption key of a ciphertext without decryption. Here, we provide a brief description of the cryptographic
scheme’s functionalities that we use throughout our protocols. The cyclotomic polynomial ring of dimensionN , whereN is a power-of-two
integer, defines the plaintext and ciphertext space asRQL =ZQL[X]/(XN+1), withQL=
∏L
0 qi in our case. Each qi is a unique prime, andQL
is the ciphertext modulus at an initial level L. Note that a plaintext encodes a vector of up toN/2 values. Below, we introduce the main functions
that we use in our system. We denote by c=(c0,c1)∈R2QL and p∈RQL , a ciphertext (indicated as boldface) and a plaintext, respectively.
p¯ denotes an encoded(packed) plaintext. We denote by Lc, Sc, L, and S, the current level of a ciphertext c, the current scale of c, the initial level,
and the initial scale (precision) of a fresh ciphertext respectively, and we use the equivalent notations for plaintexts. The functions below that start
with ’D’ are distributed, and executed among all the secret-key-holders, whereas the others can be executed locally by anyone with the public key.
• SecKeyGen(1λ): Returns the set of secret keys {ski}, i.e., ski for each party Pi, for a security parameter λ.
• DKeyGen({ski}): Returns the collective public key pk.
• Encode(msg) : Returns a plaintext p¯∈RQL with scale S, encodingmsg.
• Decode(p¯) : For p¯∈RQLp and scale Sp, returns the decoding of p.
• DDecrypt(c,{ski}): For c∈R2QLc and scale Sc, returns the plaintext p∈RQLc with scale Sc.
• Enc(pk,p¯): Returns cpk∈R2QL with scale S such that DDecrypt(cpk,{ski})≈ p¯.
• Add(cpk,c′pk): Returns (c+c
′)pk at level min(Lc,Lc′) and scale max(Sc,Sc′).
• Sub(cpk,c′pk): Returns (c−c′)pk at level min(Lc,Lc′) and scale max(Sc,Sc′).
• Mulpt(cpk,p¯): Returns (cp)pk at level min(Lc,Lp) with scale (Sc×Sp).
• Mulct(cpk,c′pk): Returns (cc
′)pk at level min(Lc,Lc′) with scale (Sc×Sc′).
• RotL/R(cpk,k): Homomorphically rotates cpk to the left/right by k positions.
• Res(cpk): Returns cpk with scale Sc/qLc at level Lc−1.
• SetScale(cpk,S): Returns cpk with scale S at level Lc−1.
• KS(cpk∈R3): Returns cpk∈R2.
• DKeySwitch(cpk,pk′,{ski}) : Returns cpk′ .
• DBootstrap(cpk,Lc,Sc,{ski}): Returns cpk with initial level L and scale S.
4
!!!" !#
!$ !% !& !'
Querier
Figure 1: POSEIDON’s System Model.
We note that Res(·) is applied to a resulting ciphertext after each multiplication. Further, for a ciphertext at an initial level L, at most an L-depth
circuit can be evaluated. To enable more homomorphic operations to be carried on, the ciphertext must be re-encrypted to its original level
L. This is done by the bootstrapping functionality (DBootstrap(·)). Encode(·) enables us to pack several values into one ciphertext and operate
on them in parallel.
For the sake of clarity, we differentiate between the functionality of the collective key-switch (DKeySwitch(·)), that requires interaction
between all the parties, and a local key-switch (KS(·)) that uses a special public-key. The former is used to decrypt the results or change
the encryption key of a ciphertext. The latter, which does not require interactivity, is used during the local computation for slot rotations or
relinearization after each multiplication. We provide the frequently used symbols and notations in Table IV, Appendix A.
IV. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
We introduce POSEIDON’s system and threat model, as well as its objectives (Sections IV-A and IV-B). Moreover, we provide a high level
description of its functionality (Sections IV-C and IV-D).
A. System and Threat Model
We introduce POSEIDON’s system and threat model below.
SystemModel. We consider a setting whereN parties, each locally holding its own dataXi, and one-hot vector of labels yi, collectively train
a neural network (NN) model. At the end of the training process, a querier – which can be one of theN parties or an external entity – queries
the model and obtains prediction results yq on its evaluation dataXq. The parties involved in the training process are interested in preserving the
privacy of their local data, the intermediate model updates, and the resulting model. The querier obtains prediction results on the trained model and
keeps its evaluation data confidential. We assume that the parties are interconnected and organized in a tree-network structure for communication
efficiency, as shown in Figure 1 (thick lines). However, our system is fully distributed and does not assume any hierarchy, therefore remaining
agnostic of the network topology, e.g., we can consider a fully-connected network, or a star topology in which each party communicates with
a central server (dotted lines in Figure 1).
Threat Model. We consider a passive-adversary model with collusions of up toN−1 parties: i.e., the parties follow the protocol but up toN−1
parties might share among them their inputs and observations during the training phase of the protocol, to extract information about the other
parties’ inputs through membership inference or federated learning attacks [76], [84], [53], [117], [111], prevented by our work. Inference attacks
on the model’s prediction phase, such as membership [100] or model inversion [40], exploit the final prediction result, and are out-of-the-scope
of this work. We discuss complementary security mechanisms that can bound the information a querier infers from the prediction results and
an extension to the active-adversary model in Appendix I-A.
B. Objectives
POSEIDON’s main objective is to enable the privacy-preserving training of and the evaluation on neural networks in the above system and
threat model. During the training process, POSEIDON protects both the intermediate updates and the final model weights — that can potentially
leak information about the parties’ input data [53], [76], [84], [117] — from any party. In the inference step, the parties holding the protected
model should not learn the querier’s data, or the prediction results, and the querier should not obtain the model’s weights. Therefore, POSEIDON’s
objective is to protect the parties’ and querier’s data confidentiality, as well as the trained model confidentiality, as defined below:
• Data Confidentiality. During training and prediction, no party Pi (including the querier Pq) should learn more information about the
input dataXj of any other honest party Pj (j 6=i, including the querier Pq), other than what can be deduced from its own input dataXi,yi
(or the inputXq and output yq, for the querier).
• Model Confidentiality. During training and prediction, no party Pi (including the querier Pq) should gain more information about the
trained model weights, other than what can be deduced from its own input dataXi,yi (orXq,yq for the querier).
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Protocol 1 Collective Training
Inputs: Xi,yi for i∈{1,2,...,N}
Outputs: Wm1,·,Wm2,·,...,Wm`,·
PREPARE:
1: Parties collectively agree on `,h1,...,h`,η,ϕ(·),m,b
2: Each Pi generates ski←SecKeyGen(1λ)
3: Parties collectively generate pk←DKeyGen({ski})
4: Each Pi encodes its local data as X¯i, y¯i
5: P1 initializesW 01,·,W 02,·,...,W 0`,·
6: for k=0→m−1 do
MAP:
7: P1 sendsW k1,·,W k2·,...,W k`,· down the tree
8: Each Pi does:
9: Local Gradient Descent Computation:
10: ∇W k1,i,∇W k2,i,...,∇W k`,i
COMBINE:
11: Parties collectively aggregate:∇W k1,·,...,∇W k`,·←∑N
i=1∇W k1,i,...,∇W k`,i
12: P1 obtains∇W k1,·,∇W k2,·,...,∇W k`,·
REDUCE (performed by P1) :
13: for j=1→` do
14: W k+1j,· +=η
∇Wkj,·
b×N
15: end for
16: end for
C. Overview of POSEIDON
POSEIDON achieves its objectives by exploiting the MHE scheme described in Section III-C. In particular, the model weights are kept
encrypted, with the parties’ collective public key, throughout the training process. The operations required for the communication-efficient
training of neural networks are enabled by the scheme’s computation homomorphic properties, which enables the parties to perform operations
between their local data and the encrypted model weights. To enable oblivious inference on the trained model, POSEIDON utilizes the scheme’s
key-switching functionality that allows the parties to collectively re-encrypt the prediction results with the querier’s public key.
POSEIDON employs several packing schemes to enable Single Instruction, Multiple Data (SIMD) operations on the weights of various network
layers (e.g., fully connected or convolutional ones) and uses approximations that enable the evaluation of multiple activation functions (e.g.,
Sigmoid, Softmax, ReLU) under encryption. Furthermore, to account for the complex operations required for the forward and backward passes
performed during the training of a neural network, POSEIDON uses the scheme’s distributed (collective) bootstrapping capability that enables
us to refresh ciphertexts. In the following subsection, we provide a high-level description of POSEIDON’ phases, the cryptographic operations
and optimizations are described in Section V.
We present POSEIDON as a synchronous distributed learning protocol throughout the paper. An extension to asynchronous distributed NNs
is presented in Appendix I-B.
D. High-Level Protocols
To describe the distributed training of and evaluation on NNs, we employ the extended MapReduce abstraction for privacy-preserving
machine learning computations introduced in SPINDLE [41]. The overall learning procedure is composed of four phases: PREPARE, MAP,
COMBINE, and REDUCE. Protocol 1 describes the steps required for the federated training of a neural network withN parties. The bold
terms denote encrypted values andW kj,i represents the weight matrix of the j
th layer, at iteration k, of the party Pi. When there is no ambiguity
or when we refer to the global model, we replace the sub-index i with · and denote weights byW kj,·. Similarly, we denote the local gradients
at party Pi by∇W kj,i, for each network layer j and iteration k. Throughout the paper, the nth row of a matrix that belongs to the ith party
is represented byXi[n] and its encoded (packed) version as X¯i[n].
1) PREPARE: In this offline phase, the parties collectively agree on the learning parameters: the number of hidden layers (l), the number of
neurons (hj) in each layer j,∀j∈{1,2,...,l}, the learning rate (η), the number of global iterations (m), the activation functions to be used in
each layer (ϕ(·)) and their approximations (see Section V-B), and the local batch size (b). Then, the parties generate their secret keys ski and
collectively generate the public key pk. Subsequently, they collectively normalize or standardize their input data with the secure aggregation
protocol described in [42]. Each Pi encodes (packs) its input data samples Xi and output labels yi (see Section V-A) as X¯i,y¯i. Finally, the
root of the tree (P1) initializes and encrypts the global weights.
Weight Initialization. To avoid exploding or vanishing gradients, we rely on commonly used techniques: (i) Xavier initialization for the sigmoid
or tanh activated layers: Wj =r×hj−1 where r is a random number sampled from a uniform distribution in the range [−1,1] [45], and (ii)
He initialization [50] for ReLU activated layers, where the Xavier-initialized weights are multiplied twice by their variance.
2) MAP: The root of the tree P1 communicates the current encrypted weights, to every other party for their local gradient descent (LGD)
computation.
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Protocol 2 Local Gradient Descent (LGD) Computation
Inputs: W k1,·,W k2,·,...,W k`,·
Outputs: ∇W k1,i,∇W k2,i,...,∇W k`,i. Note that i and k indices are omitted in this protocol.
1: for t=1→b do . Forward Pass
2: L0=X¯[t]
3: for j=1→` do
4: Uj=Lj−1×Wj
5: Lj=ϕ(Uj)
6: end for
7: E`= y¯[t]−L` . Backpropagation
8: E`=ϕ
′(U`)E`
9: ∇W`+=LT`−1×E`
10: for j=`−1→1 do
11: Ej=Ej+1×WTj+1
12: Ej=ϕ
′(Uj)Ej
13: ∇Wj+=LTj−1×Ej
14: end for
15: end for
LGD Computation: Each Pi performs b forward and backward passes, i.e., to compute and aggregate the local gradients, by processing each
sample of its respective batch. Protocol 2 describes the LGD steps performed by each party Pi, at iteration k; represents an element-wise
product and ϕ′(·) the derivative of an activation function. As the protocol refers to one local iteration for a specific party, we omit k and i from
the weight and gradient indices. This protocol describes the typical operations for the forward pass and backpropagation using stochastic gradient
descent (SGD) with the L2 loss (see Section III). We note that the operations in this protocol are performed over encrypted data.
3) COMBINE: In this phase, each party communicates its encrypted local gradients to their parent, and each parent homomorphically sums
the received gradients with their own ones. At the end of this phase, the root of the tree (P1) receives the globally aggregated gradients.
4) REDUCE: P1 updates the global model weights by using the averaged aggregated gradients. The averaging is done with respect to the global
batch size |B|=b×N , as described in Section III-B.
Training Termination: In our system, we stop the learning process after a predefined number of epochs. We discuss other well-known techniques
for the termination of NN training and how to integrate them in POSEIDON in Appendix I-B.
Prediction: At the end of the training phase, the model is kept in an encrypted form such that no individual party or the querier can access
the model weights. To enable oblivious inference, the querier encrypts its evaluation dataXq with the parties’ collective key. We note that an
oblivious inference is equivalent to one forward pass (see Protocol 2), except that the first plaintext multiplication (Mulpt(·)) of L0 with the
first layer weights is substituted with a ciphertext multiplication (Mulct(·)). At the end of the forward pass, the parties collectively re-encrypt
the result with the querier’s public key by using the key-switch functionality of the underlying MHE scheme. Thus, only the querier is able
to decrypt the prediction results. Note that any party Pi can perform the oblivious inference step, but the collaboration between all the parties
is required to perform the distributed bootstrap and key-switch functionalities.
V. CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATIONS AND OPTIMIZATIONS
We first present the alternating packing (AP) approach that we use for packing the weight matrices of NNs (Section V-A). We then explain
how we enable activation functions on encrypted values (Section V-B) and introduce the cryptographic building blocks and functions employed in
POSEIDON (Section V-C), together with their execution pipeline and their complexity (Sections V-D and V-E). Finally, we formulate a constrained
optimization problem that depends on a cost function for choosing the parameters of the cryptoscheme (Section V-F).
A. Alternating Packing (AP) Approach
For the efficient computation of the forward pass and backpropagation described in Protocol 2, we rely on the packing capabilities of the
cryptoscheme that enables Single Instruction, Multiple Data (SIMD) operations on ciphertexts. Packing enables coding a vector of values in
a ciphertext and to parallelize the computations across its different slots, thus significantly improving the overall performance.
Existing packing strategies that are commonly used for machine learning operations on encrypted data [41], e.g., the row-based [61] or
diagonal [49], require a high-number of rotations for the execution of the matrix-matrix multiplications and matrix transpose operations, performed
during the forward and backward pass of the local gradient descent computation (see Protocol 2). We here remark that the number of rotations
has a significant effect on the overall training time of a neural network on encrypted data, as they require costly key-switch operations (see
Section V-E). As an example, the diagonal approach scales linearly with the size of the weight matrices, when it is used for batch-learning of neural
networks, due to the matrix transpose operations in the backpropagation. We follow a different packing approach and process each batch sample
one by one, making the execution embarrassingly parallelizable. This enables us to optimize the number of rotations, to eliminate the transpose
operation applied to matrices in the backpropagation, and to scale logarithmically with the dimension and number of neurons in each layer.
We propose an "alternating packing (AP) approach" that combines row-based and column-based packing, i.e., rows or columns of the matrix are
vectorized and packed into one ciphertext. In particular, the weight matrix of every FC layer in the network is packed following the opposite approach
from that used to pack the weights of the previous layer. With the AP approach, the number of rotations scales logarithmically with the dimension
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Protocol 3 Alternating Packing (AP) Protocol
Inputs: Xi,yi,d,{h1,h2,...,h`},`
Outputs: W 01,·,W 02,·,...,W 0`,·,X¯i,y¯i
1: for i=1→N each Pi do
2: Initialize |gap|=max(h1−d,0) . Input Preparation
3: for n=1→|Xi| do
4: Xi[n]=Replicate(Xi[n],h1,gap)
5: X¯i[n]=Encode(Xi[n])
6: end for
7: if `%2!=0 then . Labels Preparation
8: Initialize |gap|=h`
9: yi=Flatten(yi,gap,’·’)
10: end if
11: y¯i=Encode(yi)
12: if i==1 then . P1 performs Weight Initialization:
13: InitializeW01,·,W02,·,...,W0`,·
14: for j=1→` do
15: if j%2==0 then . Row Packing
16: if hj−2>hj then
17: Initialize |gap|=hj−2−hj
18: end if
19: W0j,·=Flatten(W0j,·,gap,’r’)
20: W 0j,·=Enc(pk,W0j,·)
21: else . Column Packing
22: if hj+1>hj−1 then
23: Initialize |gap|=hj+1−hj−1
24: end if
25: W0j,·=Flatten(W0j,·,gap,’c’)
26: W 0j,·=Enc(pk,W0j,·)
27: end if
28: end for
29: end if
30: end for
of the matrices, i.e., the number of features (d), and the number of hidden neurons in each layer (hi). To enable this, we pad the matrices with
zeros to get power-of-two dimensions. In addition, the AP approach reduces the cost of transforming the packing between two consecutive layers.
Protocol 3 describes a generic way for the initialization of encrypted weights for an `-layer MLP by P1 and for the encoding of the input
matrix (Xi) and labels (yi) of each party Pi. It takes as inputs the NN parameters: the dimension of the data (d) that describes the shape of
the input layer, the number of hidden neurons in the jth layer (hj), and the number of outputs (h`). We denote by gap a vector of zeros, and
by |·| the size of a vector or the number of rows of a matrix. Replicate(v,k,gap) returns a vector that replicates v, k times with a gap in between
each replica. Flatten(W,gap,dim), flattens the rows or columns of a matrixW into a vector and introduces gap in between each row/column.
If a vector is given as input to this function, it places gap in between all of its indices. The argument dim indicates flattening of rows (’r’) or
columns (’c’) and dim=’·’ for the case of vector inputs.
We observe that the rows (or columns) packed into one ciphertext, must be aligned with the rows (or columns) of the following layer for
the next layer multiplications in the forward pass and for the alignment of multiplication operations in the backpropagation, as depicted in Table I
(e.g., see steps F1, F6, B3, B5, B6). We enable this alignment by adding gap between rows or columns and using rotations, described in the
next section. Note that these steps correspond to the weight initialization and to the input preparation steps of the PREPARE (offline) phase.
Convolutional Layer Packing. To optimize the SIMD operations for convolutional (CV) layers, we decompose the nth input sampleXi[n]
into t smaller matrices that are going to be convoluted with the weight matrix. We pack these decomposed flattened matrices into one ciphertext,
with a gap in between each matrix that is defined with respect to the number of neurons in the next layer, similarly to the AP approach. The
weight matrix is then replicated t times with the same gap between each replica. Protocol 5 in Appendix G shows how to pack a CV layer
weight matrix and the input data in case of a convolutional layer. If the next layer is another convolution or downsampling layer, the gap is
not needed and the values in the slots are rearranged during the training execution (see Section V-C).
Downsampling (Pooling) Layers. As there is no weight matrix for downsampling layers, they are not included in the offline packing phase.
The cryptographic operations for pooling are described in Section V-D.
B. Approximated Activation Functions
For the encrypted evaluation of non-linear activation functions, such as Sigmoid or Softmax, we use least-squares approximations and rely on
the optimized polynomial evaluation that, as described in [41], consumes dlog(da+1)e levels for an approximation degree da. For the piece-wise
function ReLU, we approximate the smooth approximation of ReLU, softplus (SmoothReLU), ϕ(x)=ln(1+ex) with least-squares. Lastly,
we use derivatives of the approximated functions. We discuss possible alternatives to these approximations in Appendix C.
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To achieve better approximation with the lowest possible degree, we apply two approaches to keep the input range of the activation function as
small as possible, by using (i) different weight initialization techniques for different layers (i.e., Xavier or He initialization), and (ii) collective normal-
ization of the data by sharing and collectively aggregating statistics on each party’s local data in a privacy-preserving way [42]. Finally, the interval
and the degree of the approximations are chosen based on the heuristics on the data distribution in a privacy-preserving way, as described in [51].
AP Approach Representation
PREPARE:
1. Each Pi prepares
Xi[n],yi[n]
EncodeXi[n], yi[n]→X¯i[n], y¯i[n]
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2. P1 initializesW1,·
Vectorize columns, pack with |gap|=0
W 01,·=Flatten(W01,·,gap,’c’)
3. P1 initializesW2,·
Vectorize rows, pack with |gap|=d−h`
W 02,·=Flatten(W02,·,gap,’r’)
4. Each Pi generatesmasks m¯1,m¯2
m¯1=[1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,...]
m¯2=[1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,...]
Forward Pass (Each Pi):
1.U1=L¯0×W1,·
2.L1=ϕ(U1)
F1.U1=Mulpt(L¯0,W1,·), Res(U1)
F2.U1=RIS(U1,1,d)
F3.U1=Mulpt(U1,m¯1), Res(U1)
F4.U1=RR(U1,1,h`)
F5.L1=ϕ(U1)
3.U2=L1×W2,·
4.L2=ϕ(U2)
F6.U2=Mulct(L1,W2,·), Res(L2)
F7.U2=RIS(U1,d,h1)
F8.L2=Mulpt(L2,m¯2), Res(L2)
F9. DBootstrap(U2)
F10.L2=ϕ(U2)
Backpropagation (Each Pi):
1.E2= y¯i[n]−L2 B1.E2=Sub(y¯i[n],L2)
2.E2=(ϕ′(U2))E2
B2. d=ϕ′(U2)
B3.E2=Mulct(E2,d), Res(E2)
B4.E2=RR(E2,d,h1)
3.∇W2,i=LT1 ×El B5.∇W2,i=Mulct(L1,E2), Res(∇W2,i)
4.E1=E2×WT2,· B6.E1=Mulct(E2,W2,i), Res(E1)B7.E1=RIS(E1,1,h`)
5.E1=(ϕ′(U1)E1)
B8. d=ϕ′(U1)
B9. d=Mulpt(d,m¯1)
B10.E1=Mulct(E1,d), Res(E1)
B11. DBootstrapALT(E1)
6.∇W1,i=L¯T0 ×E1
B12.E1=Mulpt(E1,m¯1), Res(E1)
B13.E1=RR(E1,1,d)
B14.∇W1,i=Mulpt(L¯0,E1), Res(∇W1,i)
Update (at P1):
1.Wj,·+=η
∇Wj,·
b×N
∀j∈{1,2,..,l}
U1. SetScale(∇Wj,·,S∇Wj,·×(b×N))/η)
U2.Wj,·=Add(Wj,·,∇Wj,·)
U3. DBootstrap(Wj,·)
TABLE I: Execution pipeline for a 2-layer MLP network with Alternating Packing (AP). Orange steps indicate the operations introduced toDBootstrapALT(·).
C. Cryptographic Building Blocks
We present each cryptographic function that we employ to enable the privacy-preserving training of NNs withN parties. We also discuss
the optimizations employed to avoid costly transpose operations in the encrypted domain.
Rotations. As we rely on packing capabilities, computation of the inner-sum of vector-matrix multiplications and transpose operation implies
a restructuring of the vectors, that can only be achieved by applying slot rotations. Throughout the paper, we use two types of rotation functions:
(i) Rotate For Inner Sum (RIS(c,p,s)) is used to compute the inner-sum of a packed vector c by homomorphically rotating it to the left with
RotL(c,p) and by adding it to itself iteratively log2(s) times, and (ii) Rotate For Replication (RR(c,p,s)) replicates the values in the slots of
a ciphertext by rotating the ciphertext to the right with RotR(c,p) and by adding to itself, iteratively log2(s) times. For both functions, p is
multiplied by two at each iteration, thus both yield log2(s) rotations. As rotations are costly cryptographic functions (see Table II), and the matrix
9
Protocol 4 DBootstrapALT(·)
Inputs: cpk=(c0,c1)∈R2Q` encryptingmsg, λ a security parameter, φ(·) a linear transformation over the field of complex numbers, a a common reference
polynomial, si the secret-key of each party Pi, χerr a distribution overR, where each coefficient is independently sampled from Gaussian distribution
with the standard deviation σ=3.2, and bound b6σc.
Constraints:Q`>(N+1)·||msg||·2λ.
Outputs: c′pk=(c′0,c′1)∈R2QL
1: for all Pi do
2: Mi←R||msg||·2λ , e0,i,e1,i←χerr
3: M ′i←Encode(φ(Decode(Mi)))
4: h0,i←sic1+Mi+e0,i modQ`
5: h1,i←−sia−Mi+e1,i modQL
6: end for
7: h0←∑h0,i,h1←∑h1,i
8: c′0←Encode(φ(Decode(c0+h0 modQ`)))
9: return c′pk=(c′0+h1 modQL,a)∈R2QL
operations required for NN training require a considerable amount of rotations, we minimize the number of executed rotations by leveraging
a modified bootstrapping operation, that automatically performs some of the required rotations.
Distributed Bootstrapping with Arbitrary Linear Transformations. To execute the high-depth homomorphic operations required for
training NNs, bootstrapping is required several times to refresh a ciphertext, depending on the initial level L. In POSEIDON, we use a distributed
version of bootstrapping [82], as it is several orders of magnitude more efficient than the traditional centralized bootstrapping. Then we modify it,
to leverage on the interaction to automatically perform some of the rotations, or pooling operations, embedded as transforms in the bootstrapping.
Mouchet et al. replace the expensive bootstrap circuit by a one-round protocol where the parties collectively switch a Brakerski/Fan-Vercauteren
(BFV) [39] ciphertext to secret-shares in ZNt . Since the BFV encoding and decoding algorithms are linear transformations, they can be performed
without interaction on a secret-shared plaintext. Despite its properties, the protocol that Mouchet et al. propose for the BFV scheme cannot
be directly applied to CKKS, as CKKS is a leveled scheme): The re-encryption process extends the residue number system (RNS) basis from
Q` toQL. Modular reduction of the masks inQ` will result in an incorrect encryption. Our solution to this limitation is to collectively switch
the ciphertext to a secret-shared plaintext with statistical indistinguishability.
We define this protocol asDBootstrapALT(·) (Protocol 4) that takes as inputs a ciphertext cpk at level ` encrypting a messagemsg and returns a
ciphertext c′pk at levelL encryptingφ(msg), whereφ(·) is a linear transformation over the field of complex numbers. We denote by ||a|| the infinity
norm of the vector or polynomial a. As the security of the RLWE is based on computational indistinguishability, switching to the secret-shared
domain does not hinder security. We refer to Appendix E and F for additional technical details and the security proof of our protocol, respectively.
Optimization of the Vector-Transpose Matrix Product. The backpropagation step of the local gradient computation at each party requires
several multiplications of a vector (or matrix) with the transposed vector (or matrix) (see Lines 11-13 of Protocol 2). The naïve multiplication of
a vector v with a transposed weight matrixWT that is fully packed in one ciphertext, requires convertingW of size g×k, from column-packed
to row-packed. This is equivalent to applying a permutation of the plaintext slots, that can be expressed with a plaintext matrixWgk×gk and
homomorphically computed by doing a matrix-vector multiplication. As a result, a naïve multiplication requires
√
g×k rotations followed by
log2(k) rotations to obtain the inner sum from the matrix-vector multiplication. We propose several approaches to reduce the number of rotations
when computing the multiplication of a packed matrix (to be transposed) and a vector:
• For the mini-batch gradient descent, we do not perform operations on the batch matrix. Instead, we process each batch sample in parallel,
because having separate vectors (instead of a matrix that is packed into one ciphertext) enables us to reorder them at a lower cost. This
approach translates `matrix transpose operations to be transposes in vectors (the transpose of the vectors representing each layer activations
in the backpropagation, see Line-13, Protocol 2).
• Instead of taking the transpose of the weight matrix, we replicate the values in the vector that will be multiplied with the transposed matrix
(for the operation in Line-11, Protocol 2), leveraging the gaps between slots with the AP approach. That is, for a vector v of size k and
the column-packed matrixW of size g×k, v has the form [a,0,0,0. . . ,b,0,0,0,. . . ,c,0,0,0,. . . ] with at least k zeros in between values
(due to Protocol 3). Hence, any resulting ciphertext requiring the transpose of the matrix that will be subsequently multiplied, will also
include gaps in between values. We apply RR(v,1,k) that consumes log2(k) rotations to generate [a,a,a,...0...,b,b,b,..,0...,c,c,c,...,0,...].
Finally, we compute the productP=Mulct(v,W ) and apply RIS(P,1,g) to get the inner sum with log2(g) rotations.
• We further optimize the performance by using DBootstrapALT(·) (Protocol 4): If the ciphertext before the multiplication must be
bootstrapped, we embed the log2(k) rotations as a linear transformation performed during the bootstrapping.
D. Execution Pipeline
Table I depicts the pipeline of the operations for processing one sample in LGD computation for a 2-layer MLP. These steps can be extended
to an `-layer MLP by following the same operations for multiple layers. The weights are encoded and encrypted using the AP approach, and
the shape of the packed ciphertext for each step is shown in the representation column. Each forward and backward pass on a layer in the pipeline
consumes one Rotate For Inner Sum (RIS(·)) and one Rotate For Replication (RR(·)) operation, except for the last layer, as the labels are
prepared according to the shape of the `th layer output. In Table I, we assume that the initial level L=7. When a bootstrapping function is
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Computational Complexity #Levels Used Communication Rounds
FORWARD P. (FP) (log2(hi−1)+log2(hi+1))·KS+Mulct+Mulpt+ϕ 2+dlog2(da+1)e − −
BACKWARD P. (BP) (log2(hi−1)+log2(hi+1))·KS+2Mulct+Mulpt+ϕ′ 3+dlog2(da)e − −
MAP `(FP+BP)−2log2(h`) `(5+dlog2(da+1)+dlog2(da)e) z(N−1)|c| 1/2
COMBINE − − z(N−1)|c| 1/2
REDUCE `(Mulpt+DB) − − −
DBootstrap (DB) Nlog2(N)(L+1)+Nlog2(N)(Lc+1) − (N−1)|c| 1
Mul Plaintext (Mulpt) 2N(Lc+1) 1 − −
Mul Ciphertext (Mulct) 4N(Lc+1)+KS 1 − −
Approx. Activation Function (ϕ) (2κ+m−κ−3+d(da+1)/2κe)·Mulct dlog2(da+1)e − −
RIS(c,p,s), RR(c,p,s) log2(s)·KS − − −
Key-switch (KS) O(N log2(N)Lcβ) − − −
TABLE II: Complexity analysis of POSEIDON’s building blocks.N ,α,L,Lc,da stand for the cyclotomic ring size, the number of secondary moduli used
during the key-switching, maximum level, current level, and the approximation degree, respectively. β=dLc+1/αe,m=dlog(da+1)e, κ=bm/2c.
followed by a masking (that is used to eliminate unnecessary values during multiplications) and/or several rotations, we perform these operations
embedded as part of the distributed bootstrapping (DBootstrapALT(·)) to minimize their computational cost. The steps highlighted in orange
are the operations embedded in the DBootstrapALT(·). The complexity of each cryptographic function is analyzed in Section V-E.
Convolutional Layers. As we flatten, replicate, and pack the kernel in one ciphertext, a CV layer follows the exact same execution pipeline
as a FC layer. However, the number of RIS(·) operations for a CV layer is smaller than for a FC layer. That is because the kernel size is usually
smaller than the number of neurons in a FC layer. For a kernel of size h=f×f , the inner sum is calculated by log2(f) rotations. Note that
when a CV layer is followed by a FC layer, the output of the ith CV layer (Li) already gives the flattened version of the matrix in one ciphertext.
We apply RR(Li,1,hi+1) for the preparation of the next layer multiplication. When a CV layer is followed by a pooling layer, however, the
RR(·) operation is not needed, as the pooling layer requires a new arrangement of the slots ofLi. We avoid this costly operation by passing
Li to DBootstrapALT(·), and by embedding both the pooling and its derivative in DBootstrapALT(·).
Pooling Layers. In POSEIDON, we evaluate our system based on average pooling as it is the most efficient type of pooling that can be evaluated
under encryption [37]. To do so, we exploit our modified collective bootstrapping to perform arbitrary linear transformations. Indeed, the average
pooling is a linear function, and so is its derivative (note that this is not the case for the max pooling). Therefore, in the case of a CV layer
followed by a pooling layer, we apply DBootstrapALT(·) and use it both to rearrange the slots and to compute the convolution of the average
pooling in the forward pass and its derivative, that is used later in the backward pass. For a h=f×f kernel size, this saves log2(h) rotations and
additions (RIS(·)) and one level if masking is needed. For max/min pooling, which are non-linear functions, we refer the reader to Appendix D
and highlight that evaluating these functions by using encrypted arithmetic remains impractical due to the need of high-precision approximations.
E. Complexity Analysis
Table II displays the communication and worst-case computational complexity of POSEIDON’s building blocks. This includes the MHE
primitives, thus facilitating the discussion on the parameter selection in the following section. We define the complexity in terms of key-switch
KS(·) operations and recall that this is a different operation than DKeySwitch(·), as explained in Section III-C. We note that KS(·) and
DBootstrap(·) are 2 orders of magnitude slower than an addition operation, rendering the complexity of an addition negligible.
We observe that POSEIDON’s communication complexity depends solely on the number of parties (N), the number of total ciphertexts sent
in each global iteration (z), and the size of one ciphertext (|c|). The building blocks that do not require communication are indicated as−.
In Table II, forward and backward passes represent the per-layer complexity for FC layers, so they are an overestimate for CV layers. Note
that the number of multiplications differs in a forward pass and a backward pass, depending on the packing scheme, e.g., if the current layer is
row-packed, it requires 1 less Mulct(·) in the backward pass, and we have 1 less Mulpt(·) in several layers, depending on the masking requirements.
Furthermore, the last layer of forward pass and the first layer of backpropagation take 1 less RR(·) operation that we gain from packing the
labels in the offline phase, depending on the NN structure (see Protocol 3). Hence, we save 2log2(h`) rotations per one LGD computation.
In the MAP phase, we provide the complexity of the local computations per Pi, depending on the total number of layers `. In the COMBINE
phase, each Pi performs an addition for the collective aggregation of the gradients in which the complexity is negligible. To update the weights,
REDUCE is done by one party (P1) and divisions do not consume levels when performed with SetScale(·). The complexity of an activation
function (ϕ(·)) depends on the approximation degree da. We note that the derivative of the activation function (ϕ′(·)) has the same complexity
as ϕ(·) with degree da−1.
For the cryptographic primitives represented in Table II, we rely on the CKKS variant of the MHE cryptosystem in [82], and we report the
dominating terms. The distributed bootstrapping takes 1 round of communication and the size of the communication scales with the number
of parties (N) and the size of the ciphertext (see [82] for details).
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F. Parameter Selection
We first discuss several details to optimize the number of Res(·) operations and give a cost function which is computed by the complexities
of each functionality presented in Table II. Finally, relying on this cost function we formulate an optimization problem for choosing POSEIDON’
parameters.
As discussed in Section III-C, we assume that each multiplication is followed by a Res(·) operation. The number of total rescaling operations,
however, can be further reduced by checking the scale of the ciphertext. When the initial scale S is chosen such thatQ/S=r for a ciphertext
modulus Q, the ciphertext is rescaled after r consecutive multiplications. This reduces the level consumption and is integrated into our cost
function hereinafter.
Cryptographic Parameters Optimization. We define the overall complexity of an `-layer MLP aiming to formulate a constrained optimization
problem for choosing the cryptographic parameters. We first introduce the total number of bootstrapping operations (B) required in one forward
and backward pass, depending on the multiplicative depth as
B= `(5+dlog2(da+1)+dlog2(da)e)
(L−τ)r ,
where r=Q/S, for a ciphertext modulusQ and an initial scale S. The number of total bootstrapping operations is calculated by the total number
of consumed levels (numerator), the level requiring a bootstrap (L−τ) and r which denotes how many consecutive multiplications are allowed
before rescaling (denominator). The initial level of a fresh ciphertext L has an effect on the design of the protocols, as the ciphertext should
be bootstrapped before the level Lc reaches a number (L−τ) that is close to zero, where τ depends on the security parameters. For a cyclotomic
ring sizeN , the initial level of a ciphertext L, and for the fixed neural network parameters such as the number of layers `, the number of neurons
in each layer h1,h2,...,h`, and for the number of global iterationsm, the overall complexity is defined as
C(N ,L)=m(
∑`
i=1
{(2log2(hi−1)+log2(hi+1))·KS+3Mulct+2Mulpt+ϕ+ϕ′}−2log2(h`)+B·DB). (1)
Note that the complexity of each KS(·) operation depends on the level of the ciphertext that it is performed on (see Table II), but we use the
initial level L in the cost function for the sake of clarity. The complexity of Mulct,Mulpt,DB, and KS is defined in Table II. Then, the optimization
problem for a fixed scale (precision) S and a security level λ, which defines the security parameters, can be formulated as
min
N ,L
C(N ,L) (2)
subject tomc={q1,...,qL};L= |mc|;Q=
L∏
i=1
qi;Q=kS, k∈R+;
QL−τ>2λ|plaintext|N ;N←postQsec(Q,λ),
where postQsec(Q,L,λ) gives the necessary cyclotomic ring sizeN , depending on the ciphertext modulus (Q) and on the desired security level
(λ), according to the homomorphic encryption standard whitepaper [16]. Eq. (2) gives the optimalN and L for a given NN structure. We then
pack each weight matrix into one ciphertext. It is worth mentioning that the solution might give anN that has fewer slots than the required
number to pack the big weight matrices in the neural network. In this case, we use a multi-cipher approach where we pack the weight matrix
using more than one ciphertext and do the operations in parallel.
Multi-cipher Approach. In the case of a big weight matrix, we divide the flattened weight vector into multiple ciphertexts and carry out the
neural network operations on several ciphertexts in parallel. E.g., for a weight matrix of size 1,024×64 andN/2=4,096 slots, we divide the
weight matrix into 1,024×64/4,096=16 ciphers.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We demonstrate that POSEIDON achieves the Data and Model Confidentiality properties defined in Section IV-B, under a passive-adversary
model with up toN−1 colluding parties. We follow the real/ideal world simulation paradigm [68] for the confidentiality proofs.
The semantic security of the CKKS scheme is based on the hardness of the decisional RLWE problem [29], [72], [69]. The achieved practical
bit-security against state-of-the-art attacks can be computed using Albrecht’s LWE-Estimator [16], [17]. The security of the used distributed
cryptographic protocols, i.e., DKeyGen(·) and DKeySwitch(·), relies on the proofs by Mouchet et al. [82]. They show that these protocols
are secure in a passive-adversary model with up toN−1 colluding parties, under the assumption that the underlying RLWE problem is hard [82].
The security of DBootstrap(·), and its variant DBootstrapALT(·) is based on Lemma 1 which we state and prove in Appendix F.
Remark 1. Any encryption broadcast to the network in Protocol 1 is re-randomized to avoid leakage about parties’ confidential data by two
consecutive broadcasts. We omit this operation in Protocol 1 for clarity.
Proposition 1. Assume that POSEIDON’s encryptions are generated using the CKKS cryptosystem with parameters (N ,QL,S) ensuring a
post-quantum security level of λ. Given a passive adversary corrupting at mostN−1 parties, POSEIDON achieves Data and Model Confidentiality
during training.
Proof (Sketch). Let us assume a real-world simulator St that simulates the view of a computationally-bounded adversary corrupting N−1
parties, as such having access to the inputs and outputs ofN−1 parties. As stated above, any encryption under CKKS with parameters that
ensure a post-quantum security level of λ is semantically secure. During POSEIDON’s training phase, the model parameters that are exchanged
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in between parties are encrypted, and all phases rely on the aforementioned CPA-secure-proven protocols. Moreover, as shown in Appendix F, the
DBootstrap(·) and DBootstrapALT(·) protocols are simulatable. Hence, St can simulate all of the values communicated during POSEIDON’s
training phase by using the parameters (N ,QL,S) to generate random ciphertexts such that the real outputs cannot be distinguished from the ideal
ones. The sequential composition of all cryptographic functions remains simulatable by St due to using different random values in each phase
and due to Remark 1. As such, there is no dependency between the random values that an adversary can leverage on. Moreover, the adversary
is not able to decrypt the communicated values of an honest party because decryption is only possible with the collaboration of all the parties.
Following this, POSEIDON protects the data confidentiality of the honest party/ies.
Analogously, the same argument follows to prove that POSEIDON protects the confidentiality of the trained model, as it is a function of the
parties’ inputs, and its intermediate and final weights are always under encryption. Hence, POSEIDON eliminates federated learning attacks [53],
[76], [84], [117], that aim at extracting private information about the parties from the intermediate parameters or the final model.
Proposition 2. Assume that POSEIDON’s encryptions are generated using the CKKS cryptosystem with parameters (N ,QL,S) ensuring a
post-quantum security level of λ. Given a passive adversary corrupting at mostN−1 parties, POSEIDON achieves Data and Model Confidentiality
during prediction.
Proof (Sketch). (a) Let us assume a real-world simulator Sp that simulates the view of a computationally-bounded adversary corruptingN−1
computing nodes (parties). The Data Confidentiality of the honest parties and Model Confidentiality is ensured following the arguments of
Proposition 1, as the prediction protocol is equivalent to a forward-pass performed during a training iteration by a computing party. Following
similar arguments to Proposition 1, the encryption of the querier’s input data (with the parties common public key pk) can be simulated by
Sp. The only additional function used in the prediction step is DKeySwitch(·) that is proven to be simulatable by Sp [82]. Thus, POSEIDON
ensures Data Confidentiality of the querier. (b) Let us assume a real-world simulator S′p that simulates a computationally-bounded adversary
corrupting N−2 parties and the querier. Data Confidentiality of the querier is trivial, as it is controlled by the adversary. The simulator has
access to the prediction result as the output of the process for Pq, so it can produce all the intermediate (indistinguishable) encryptions that the
adversary sees (based on the simulatability of the key-switch/collective decrypt protocol [82]). Following this and the arguments of Proposition 1,
Data and Model Confidentiality are ensured during prediction. We remind here that the membership inference [100] and model inversion [40]
are out-of-the-scope attacks (see I-A for complementary security mechanisms against these attacks).
VII. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we experimentally evaluate POSEIDON’s performance and present our empirical results. We also compare POSEIDON to other
state-of-the-art privacy-preserving federated learning solutions.
A. Implementation Details
We implement POSEIDON in Go [6] building on top of the Lattigo lattice-based library [77] for the multiparty cryptographic operations. We
make use of Onet [4] and build a decentralized system where the parties communicate over TCP with secure channels (TLS).
B. Experimental Setup
We use Mininet [78] to evaluate POSEIDON in a virtual network with an average network delay of 0.17ms and 1Gbps bandwidth. All the
experiments are performed on 10 Linux servers with Intel Xeon E5-2680 v3 CPUs running at 2.5GHz with 24 threads on 12 cores and 256
GB RAM. Unless otherwise stated, in our default experimental setting, we instantiate POSEIDON withN=10 parties. When we run experiments
with more thanN=10 parties, we employ multiple cores on the same 10 Linux machines. As for the parameters of the cryptographic scheme,
we fix precision to 32 bits, the number of levels L=6, andN =213 for the datasets with d<32, andN =214 for those with d>32, following
the multi-cipher approach (see Section V-F).
C. Datasets
For the evaluation of POSEIDON’ performance, we use the following real-world and publicly available datasets: (a) the Breast Cancer Wisconsin
dataset (BCW) [20] with n=699,d=9,h`=2, where the aim is to model the presence of breast cancer as a function of the patients’ input
data, (b) the hand-written digits (MNIST) dataset [65] with n=70,000,d=784,h`=10 for modelling hand-written digits, (c) the Epileptic
seizure recognition (ESR) dataset [38] with n=11,500,d=179,h`=2 that is used to model seizure, and (d) the default of credit card clients
(CREDIT) dataset [112] with n=30,000,d=23,h`=2 where the goal is to model the status of the clients’ default payment. Recall that h`
represents the number of neurons in the last layer of a neural network (NN), i.e., the number of output labels. Moreover, since we pad with
zeros each dimension of a weight matrix to the nearest power-of-two (see Section V-A), for the experiments using the CREDIT, ESR, and MNIST
datasets, we actually perform the NN training with d=32, 256 and 1,024 features, respectively. To evaluate the scalability of our system, we
generate synthetic datasets and vary the number of features or samples. Finally, for our experiments we evenly and randomly distribute all the
above datasets among the participating parties. We note that the data and label distribution between the parties, and its effects on the model
accuracy is orthogonal to this paper (see Appendix I-B for extensions related to the data and label distribution).
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Dataset Accuracy Execution time (s)
C1 C2 L D POSEIDON Training Inference
BCW 97.8% 97.4% 93.9% 97.4% 96.9% 91.06 0.21
ESR 93.6% 91.2% 89.9% 91.1% 90.4% 851.84 0.30
CREDIT 81.4% 80.9% 79.6% 80.6% 80.2% 516.61 0.26
MNIST 92.1% 91.3% 87.8% 90.6% 89.9% 5,283.1 0.38
TABLE III: POSEIDON’s accuracy and execution times for different settings. The trained model accuracy is compared to several non-private approaches.
8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024
d
0
10
30
50
100
200
500
R
u
n
ti
m
e
 (
s)
One-Cipher
Multi-Cipher
(a) Increasing number of features (d),
N=10, and n=2,000∗N .
3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24
N
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
R
u
n
ti
m
e
 (
s)
16.4
18.3 19.3
21.4
23.8 24.6
25.6
27.3
Computation
Communication
(b) Increasing number of parties (N),
each having 200 samples (n).
3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24
N
0
5
10
15
20
25
R
u
n
ti
m
e
 (
s)
16.5
9.5
7.1
6.1
5.2
3.9 3.2
1.8
Computation
Communication
(c) Increasing number of parties (N)
when n (number of data samples) is
fixed to 600.
2K 4K 8K 16K 32K 64K
n
5
50
200
500
1000
R
u
n
ti
m
e
 (
s)
19
37.9
74.4
149
295
589
Computation
Communication
(d) Increasing number of data samples
(n) when N (number of parties) is
fixed to 10.
Figure 2: POSEIDON’s training execution time and communication overhead with increasing number of parties, features, and samples, for 1 training epoch.
D. Neural Network Configuration
For the BCW, ESR, and CREDIT datasets, we deploy a 2-layer fully connected NN with 64 neurons per layer, and we use the same NN structure
for the synthetic datasets used to test POSEIDON’s scalability. For the MNIST dataset, we train a 3-layer fully connected NN with 64 neurons
per-layer. We use the approximated sigmoid and/or the approximated SmoothReLU activation functions (see Section V-B), depending on the
dataset. We train the above models for 100, 600, 500, and 1,000 global iterations for the BCW, ESR, CREDIT, and MNIST datasets, respectively.
Finally, we set the local batch size b to 10 and, as such, the global batch size isB=100 in our default setting with 10 parties.
E. Empirical Results
We experimentally evaluate POSEIDON in terms of accuracy of the trained model, execution time for both training and prediction phases,
and communication overhead. We also evaluate POSEIDON’s scalability with respect to the number of partiesN , as well as the number of data
samples n and features d in a dataset. For the interested readers, we provide microbenchmark timings and communication overhead for the
various functionalities and operations for FC, CV, and pooling layers in Appendix H-A. These can be used to extrapolate POSEIDON’s execution
time for different NN structures. We further give per-global-iteration execution times of various NN architectures in Appendix H-B and various
CNN architectures in Appendix H-C.
Model Accuracy. Table III displays POSEIDON’s accuracy results on the used real-world datasets. The accuracy column shows four baselines
with the following approaches: two approaches where the data is collected to a central party in its clear form: centralized with original activation
functions (C1), and centralized with approximated activation functions (C2); one approach where each party trains the model only with its local
data (L), and a decentralized approach with approximated activation functions (D), where the data is distributed among the 10 parties, but the
learning is performed on cleartext data, i.e., without any protection of the gradients communicated between the parties. For all experiments,
we use the same NN structure with the same learning parameters. These baselines enable us to evaluate POSEIDON’s accuracy loss due to the
approximation of the activation functions, distribution, encryption and the impact of privacy-preserving federated learning. We observe that the
accuracy loss between C1, C2, D, and POSEIDON is 0.9−3% when 32-bits precision is used. For instance, POSEIDON achieves 90.4% training
accuracy on the ESR dataset, a performance that is equivalent to a decentralized (D) non-private approach and only slightly lower compared
to centralized approaches. Finally, we compare POSEIDON’s accuracy with that achieved by one party using its local dataset, that is 1/10 of
the overall data, with exact activation functions. We observe that even with the accuracy loss due to approximation and encryption, POSEIDON
still achieves 1−3% increase in the model accuracy due to privacy-preserving collaboration.
Execution Time. As shown on the right-hand side of Table III, POSEIDON trains the BCW, ESR, and CREDIT datasets in less than 15 minutes
and the MNIST in 1.4 hours, when each dataset is evenly distributed among 10 parties. Note that POSEIDON’s overall training time for MNIST
is less than an hour when the dataset is split among 20 parties that use the same local batch size. The per-sample inference times presented in
Table III include the forward pass, the DKeySwitch(·) operations that re-encrypt the result with the querier’s public key, and the communication
among the parties. We note that as all the parties keep the model in encrypted form, any of them can process the prediction query. Hence, taking
the advantage of parallel query executions and multi-threading, POSEIDON achieves a throughput of 864,000 predictions per hour on the MNIST
dataset with the chosen NN structure.
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Scalability. Figure 2a shows the scaling of POSEIDON with the number of features (d) when the one-cipher and multi-cipher with parallelization
approaches are used for a 2-layer NN with 64 hidden neurons. The runtime refers to one epoch, i.e., a processing of all the data fromN=10
parties, each having 2,000 samples, and employing a batch size of b= 10. For small datasets with a number of features between 1 and 64,
we observe no difference in execution time between the one-cipher and multi-cipher approaches. This is because the weight matrices between
layers fit in one ciphertext with N = 213. However, we observe a larger runtime of the one-cipher approach when the number of features
increases further. This is because each power-of-two increase in the number of features requires an increase in the cryptographic parameters,
thus introducing overhead in the arithmetic operations.
We further analyse POSEIDON’s scalability with respect to the number of parties (N) and the number of total samples in the distributed dataset
(n). Figures 2b and 2c display POSEIDON’s execution time, when the number of parties ranges from 3 to 24, and one training epoch is performed,
i.e., all the data of the parties is processed once. For Figure 2b, we fix the number of data samples per party to 200 to study the effect of an
increasing number of members in the federation. We observe that POSEIDON’s execution time is almost independent ofN and is affected only
by increasing communication between the parties. When we fix the global number of samples (n), increasingN results in a runtime decrease,
as the samples are processed by the parties in parallel (see Figure 2c). Then, we evaluate POSEIDON’s runtime with an increasing number of
data samples and a fixed number of partiesN=10, in Figure 2d. We observe that POSEIDON scales linearly with the number of data samples.
Finally, we remark that POSEIDON also scales proportionally with the number of layers in the NN structure, if these are all of the same type,
i.e, FC, CV, or pooling, and if the number of neurons per layer or the kernel size is fixed (see Appendix H-B).
F. Comparison with Prior Work
A quantitative comparison of our work with the state-of-the-art solutions for privacy-preserving NN executions is a non-trivial task. Indeed,
the most recent cryptographic solutions for privacy-preserving machine learning in this setting, i.e., Helen [116] and SPINDLE [41], support
the functionalities of only regularized [116] and generalized [41] linear models respectively.
POSEIDON operates in a federated learning setting where the parties keep their data locally. This is a substantially different setting compared
to that envisioned by MPC-based solutions [81], [80], [108], [109], [27], [93] for privacy-preserving NN training. In these solutions, the parties’
data has to be communicated (i.e., secret shared) outside their premises, and the data and model confidentiality is preserved as long as there exists
an honest majority among a limited number of computing servers (typically, 2 to 4, depending on the setting). Since a quantitative comparison
with such solutions is not relevant, we provide a detailed qualitative comparison with these works in Table V, Appendix B.
Federated learning approaches based on differential privacy (DP), e.g., [66], [99], [74], train the NN while introducing some noise to the
intermediate values to mitigate adversarial inferences. However, in contrast with POSEIDON, DP-based approaches significantly degrade the utility
of the data. Furthermore, training an accurate NN model requires a high privacy budget [94], hence it remains unclear what privacy protection
is obtained in practice [55].
Finally, existing HE-based solutions [51], [83], [107] focus only on a centralized setting where the NN learning task is outsourced to a central
server. These solutions, however, employ non-realistic cryptographic parameters [107], [83], and their performance is not practical [51] due to their
costly homomorphic computations. Our system, focused on a federated learning-based and a multiparty homomorphic encryption scheme, can
improve the response time in 3 to 4 orders of magnitude: (a) The execution times produced by Nandakumar et al. [83] for processing one batch of 60
samples in a single thread and 30 threads for a NN structure with d=64, h1=32, h2=16, h3=2, are respectively 33,840s and 2,400s. When we
evaluate the same setting, but withN=10 parties, we observe that POSEIDON processes the same batch in 6.3s and 1s, respectively. We also achieve
stronger security guarantees (128 bits) than [83] (80 bits). (b) For a NN structure with 2-hidden layers of 128 neurons each, for the MNIST dataset,
CryptoDL [51] processes a batch withB=192 in 10,476.29s, whereas our system in the distributed setting processes the same batch in 34.72s.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented POSEIDON, a novel system for zero-leakage privacy-preserving federated neural network learning among N
parties. Based on lattice-based multiparty homomorphic encryption, our system protects the confidentiality of the training data, of the model,
and of the evaluation data, under a passive adversary model with collusions of up to N−1 parties. By leveraging on packing strategies and
an extended distributed bootstrapping functionality, POSEIDON is the first system demonstrating that secure federated learning on neural networks
is practical under multiparty homomorphic encryption. Our experimental evaluation shows that POSEIDON significantly improves on the accuracy
of individual local training, bringing it on par with centralized and decentralized non-private approaches. Its computation and communication
overhead scales linearly with the number of parties that participate in the training, and is between 3 to 4 orders of magnitude faster than equivalent
centralized outsourced approaches based on traditional homomorphic encryption. This work opens up the door of practical and secure federated
training in passive-adversarial settings. Future work (see Appendix I) involves extensions to other scenarios with active adversaries and further
optimizations to the learning process.
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APPENDIX A
SYMBOLS AND NOTATIONS
Table IV summarizes the symbols and notation used in our paper.
APPENDIX B
COMPARISON TO OTHER STATE-OF-THE-ART SOLUTIONS
Table V displays a qualitative comparison of POSEIDON with the state-of-the-art privacy-preserving neural network training and/or inference
solutions. The MPC-setup row of the table denotes the number of parties responsible for the execution of the NN operations. The adversarial
model for data confidentiality indicates the capabilities of the parties (active (A) or passive (P)), and collusion shows the maximum number
of possible colluding parties.
We note that several works allow as admissible adversary, i.e., collusions between one server and an arbitrary number of clients/data owners [81].
For a fair comparison, we consider only the collusions permitted between the parties (servers) that are responsible for the training. To the best
of our knowledge, POSEIDON is the only solution that performs both training and inference of NNs, in anN-party setting, yet protects data
and model confidentiality and withstands collusions up toN−1 parties. Therefore, our work differentiates itself from cloud outsourcing models
and enables a privacy-preserving federated learning approach.
APPENDIX C
APPROXIMATED ACTIVATION FUNCTION ALTERNATIVES
For the piece-wise function ReLU, we propose two alternatives: (i) approximation of square-root for the evaluation of ϕ(x)=0.5(b+
√
b2)
that is equivalent to ReLU, and (ii) approximating the smooth approximation of ReLU (SmoothReLU), or softplus, ϕ(x)=ln(1+ex), both
with least-squares. Our analysis shows that the latter achieves a better approximation for a degree da=3, whereas the former approximates
better the exact ReLU if one increases the multiplicative depth by 1 and uses da=7. In our evaluations, we use SmoothReLU for efficiency.
We note that the derivative of softplus is a sigmoid function, and we evaluate the approximated sigmoid as the derivative, as this achieves
better accuracy. Finally, the Lattigo cryptographic library [77] comes with a native way of approximating functions using Chebyshev interpolants
and an efficient algorithm to evaluate polynomials in standard or Chebyshev basis. The least-squares is the optimal solution for minimizing
the squared error over an interval, whereas Chebyshev asymptotically minimizes the maximum error. Hence, Chebyshev is more appropriate
for keeping the error bounded throughout the whole interval, but requires a larger degree for a high accuracy approximation.
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Notation Description
Pi i
th Party
Q Querier
Xi Input matrix of Pi
Xi[n] n
th row of the input matrix
yi True labels of Pi
N Total number of parties
Wkj,i Weight matrix in Pi,
for a layer j, at kth iteration
n Number of data samples
d Number of features
da Degree of an approximated polynomial
` Total number of layers
hj Number of neurons in jth layer
h` Number of output labels
η Learning rate
ϕ(·) Activation function
ϕ′(·) Derivative of the activation function
Ekj Error propagated in layer j, at k
th iteration
∇Wkj,i Gradient computed in Pi,
for a layer j, at kth iteration
b Local batch size
B Global batch size
m Number of global iterations
 Element-wise multiplication
× Matrix or vector multiplication
W Encryption ofW (bold-face)
m¯sg Encoded (packed) plaintext vectormsg
N Ring dimension
λ Security level
AT Transpose of matrixA
L Initial level of a ciphertext
S Initial scale of a ciphertext
Lc Current level of a ciphertext c
RIS(c,p,s) RotateInnerSum with log2(s) number of rotations.
RR(c,p,s) RotateReplication with log2(s) number of rotations.
Sc Current scale of a ciphertext c
TABLE IV: Frequently Used Symbols and Notations.
APPENDIX D
APPROXIMATION OF THE MAX/MIN POOLING AND ITS DERIVATIVE
The challenge of max/min pooling resides in finding the index of the maximum/minimum value in a given vector. For the sake of clarity, we
describe the max pooling. Given a vector x=(x[0],...,x[n−1]) we compute a vector y such that y[i]=1 if yi=max(x) and y[i]=0 otherwise.
Once y is computed, we can also compute the vector xmax=xy which stores max(x) at the index of the maximum and zeros at all other
indices. For approximating the max index, we follow a protocol similar to the one given in [30], described below.
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XONN
[95]
Gazelle
[59]
Blaze
[89]
MiniONN
[71]
ABY3
[80]
SecureML
[81]
SecureNN
[108]
FALCON
[109]
FLASH
[27]
TRIDENT
[93]
CryptoNets
[37]
CryptoDL
[51] [83] POSEIDON
MPC Setup 2PC 2PC 3PC 2PC 3PC 2PC 3PC 3PC 4PC 4PC 1PC 1PC 1PC N-Party
Private Infer. 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Private Train. 7 7 7 7 4 4 4 4 4 4 7 4 4 4
Data Conf.
Adversarial Model*
Collusion*
1 P 1 P 1 A 1 P 1 A/P 1 P 1 A/P 1 A/P 1 A 1 A/P 1 P’ 1 P’ 1 P’ N−1 P
No No No No No No No No No No NA NA NA N−1
Techniques GC,SS HE,GC,SS GC,SS HE,GC,SS GC,SS HE,GC,SS SS SS SS GC,SS HE HE HE HE
Supported
Layers
Linear 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Conv. 4 4 7 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 7 7 4
Pooling 4 4 7 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 7 7 4
TABLEV:Qualitative comparison of private deep learning frameworks. Conf. stands for confidentiality. A and P stand for active and passive adversarial capabili-
ties, respectively. GC, SS, HE denote garbled-circuits, secret sharing, and homomorphic encryption. Adversarial model* and collusion* take into account the servers
responsible for the training/inference. 1 P’ denotes our interpretation as [37], [83], and [51] do not present an adversarial model. NA stands for not applicable.
Given two real values a,b, with 0≤a,b≤1, we observe the following: If a>b, then a−b<ad−bd for d>1, i.e., with increasing d, smaller
values converge to zero faster than greater values and the ratio between the maximum value and all other values increases. The process can
be repeated to further increase the ratio between a and b but, unless a=1, both values will eventually converge to zero. To avoid this, we add
a second step that consists in re-normalizing a and b by computing a=a/(a+b) and b=b/(a+b). Doing so, we ensure that after each iteration,
a+b=1 and since b will eventually converge to zero, a will tend towards 1. In the special case where a=b, both values will converge to 0.5.
This algorithm can be easily generalized to vectors: Given a vector x=(x[0],...,x[n−1]), for each iteration compute x[i]=x[i]d/∑n−1j=0x[j]d.
Although theoretically possible, this iterative algorithm for max pooling is a costly and time-consuming procedure. Indeed, at each iteration, it
requires computing an inverse, which is an expensive operation, especially if a high accuracy is desired. As such, several collective bootstrapping
operations are required for each max-pooling layer. For this reason, we suggest using the average pooling, which is much more efficient, e.g.,
Dowlin et al. [37] show that low-degree approximations of max pooling will converge to a scalar multiple of the mean of k values. Hence, using
average pooling is much more efficient in the encrypted domain when the degree of the approximation for max pooling is kept small.
APPENDIX E
TECHNICAL DETAILS OF DISTRIBUTED BOOTSTRAPPING WITH ARBITRARY LINEAR TRANSFORMATIONS (DBOOTSTRAPALT(·))
A linear transformation φ(·) over a vector of n elements can be described by a n×nmatrix. As evaluating a matrix-vector multiplication
requires a number of rotations proportional to the square-root of its non-zero diagonals, this operation becomes prohibitive when the number
of non-zero diagonals is large.
Such a linear transformation can be, however, efficiently carried out locally and without interactions on a secret-shared plaintext, as
φ(msg+M)=φ(msg)+φ(M) due to the linear characteristic of φ(·). Moreover, because of the magnitude of msg+M (100 to 200 bits),
arbitrary precision complex arithmetic with sufficient precision should be used for Encode(·), Decode(·), and φ(·) to preserve the lower bits.
The collective bootstrapping protocol in [82] performs the bootstrapping through a conversion of an encryption to secret shared values and
a re-encryption in a refreshed ciphertext. We can leverage this conversion to perform the aforementioned linear transformation in the secret-shared
domain, before the refreshed ciphertext is reconstructed. This is what we call our DBootstrapALT(·) protocol (Protocol 4).
When the linear transformation is simple, i.e., it does not involve a complex permutation or has only a small number of rotations, the Encode(·)
and Decode(·) operations in Line 8, Protocol 4 can be skipped. Indeed, those two operations need to be carried out using arbitrary precision
complex arithmetic. In such cases, it is more efficient to perform the linear transformation directly on the encoded plaintext.
APPENDIX F
SECURITY ANALYSIS OF DISTRIBUTED BOOTSTRAPPING WITH ARBITRARY LINEAR TRANSFORMATIONS (DBOOTSTRAPALT(·))
The protocol DBootstrapALT(·) is a modification of the protocol DBootstrap(·) of Mouchet et al. [82], with the difference that it includes
a product of a public matrix. Both DBootstrap(·) and DBootstrapALT(·) for CKKS differ from the BFV version proposed in [82] in which
the shares are not unconditionally hiding, but statistically or computationally hiding due to the incomplete support of the used masks. Therefore,
the proof follows analogously the passive adversary security proof of the BFV DBootstrap(·) protocol in [82], with the addition of Lemma 1
which guarantees the statistical indistinguishablity of the shares in C. While the RLWE problem and Lemma 1 do not rely on the same security
assumptions, the first one being computational and the second one being statistical, given the same security parameter, they share the same
security bounds. Hence DBootstrap(·) and DBootstrapALT(·) provide the same security as the original protocol of Mouchet et al. [82].
Lemma 1. Given the distribution P0=(a+b) and P1=c with 0≤a<2δ and 0≤b,c<2λ+δ and b, c uniform, then the distributions P0 and
P1 are λ-indistinguishable; i.e., a probabilistic polynomial adversaryA cannot distinguish between both with probability greater than 2−λ:
|Pr[A→1|P=P1]−Pr[A→1|P=P0]|≤2−λ.
Proof: We refer to Algesheimer et. al [18], Section 3.2 and Schoenmakers and Tuyls [97], Appendix A, for the proof of the statistical
λ-indistinguishability.
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We recall that an encoded message msg of N/2 complex numbers with the CKKS scheme is an integer polynomial of Z[X]/(XN+1).
Given that ||msg||<2δ, and a second polynomialM ofN integer coefficients with each coefficient uniformly sampled and bounded by 2λ+δ−1
for a security parameter λ, Lemma 1 suggests that Pr[||msg(i)+M(i)||≥2λ+δ]≤2−λ, for 0≤i<N and where i denotes the ith coefficient of
the polynomial. That is, the probability of a coefficient ofmsg+M to be distinguished from a uniformly sampled integer in [0,2λ+δ) is bounded
by 2−λ. Hence, during Protocol 4 each party samples its polynomial maskM with uniform coefficients in [0,2λ+δ). The parties, however, should
have an estimate of the magnitude ofmsg to derive δ, and a probabilistic upper-bound for the magnitude can be computed by the circuit and
the expected range of its inputs.
In Protocol 4, the masks Mi are added to the ciphertext of RQ` during the decryption to the secret-shared domain. To avoid a modular
reduction of the masks inRQ` and ensure a correct re-encryption inRQL , the modulusQ` should be large enough for the additions ofN masks.
Therefore, the ciphertext modulus size should be greater than (N+1)·||M || when the bootstrapping is called. For example, forN=10, aQL
composed of a 60 bits modulus, a message msg with ||msg||<255 (taking the scaling factor ∆ into account) and λ=128, we should have
||Mi||≥2183 andQ`>11·2183. Hence, the bootstrap should be called atQ3 becauseQ2≈2180 andQ3≈2240. Although the aforementioned
details suggest that DBootstrapALT(·) is equivalent to a depth 3 to 4 circuit, depending on the parameters, it is still compelling, as it enables
us to refresh a ciphertext and apply an arbitrary complex linear transformation at the same time. Thus, its cost remains negligible compared
to a centralized bootstrapping where any transformation is applied via rotations.
APPENDIX G
CONVOLUTIONAL LAYER OFFLINE PACKING
This work introduces the protocols and algorithms for the training and prediction for feed-forward NNs for the sake of clarity. The system
however supports convolutional layers by using the packing described in this section.
Protocol 5 describes the offline packing of one CV layer and the input dataX when the first layer is a CV layer. It takesX, the initial weight
matrix of the first CV layer, the kernel size h1=f×f , the stride s, and the number of neurons in the next layer (h2). We denote by Type(i)
a function that returns the type of the ith layer as FC, CV, or pooling, whereas Decompose(X,h=f×f,s) decomposes the matrixX into
t small matrices according to a kernel size h, and the stride s. The functions Flatten() and Replicate() are defined in Section V-A. The packing
for all CV layers of a network is done the same way as described in steps 11-13 of Protocol 5, and gap is always calculated depending on the
number of neurons in the next layer (if it is an FC layer). If the following layer is a CV or downsampling layer, the gap is not needed, as the
output of the layer is processed during the distributed bootstrapping.
Protocol 5 Convolutional Layer Packing
Inputs: X,W01,·,n,h1,h2,s
Outputs: W 01,·
1: if Type(2)==FC&&h2>h1 then
2: Initialize |gap|=h2−h1
3: end if
4: for t=1→n do
5: D0,...,Dz←Decompose(X[t],h1=f×f,s)
6: for j=1→z do
7: vX=Flatten(Dj,gap,’r’)
8: end for
9: X¯[t]=Encode(pk,vX)
10: end for
11: W1=Flatten(W1,·,gap,’r’)
12: vW1=Replicate(W1,·,t,gap)
13: W 01,·=Enc(pk,vW1)
APPENDIX H
SUPPLEMENTARY EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We provide further experimental results of POSEIDON, that were left out of the main text due to space constraints. We provide the
microbenchmarks and execution times of various NN architectures.
A. Microbenchmarks
We present microbenchmark timings for the various functionalities and sub-protocols of POSEIDON in Table VII. These are measured in
an experimental setting with N =10 parties, a dimension of d=32 features, h=64 neurons in a layer or kernel size k=3×3, and degree
da=3 for the approximated activation functions for FC, CV, and average pooling benchmarks. The communication column shows the overall
communication between the parties in MB. As several HE-based solutions [37], [59], [51] use square activation functions, we also benchmark
them and compare them with the approximated activation functions with da=3.
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Topology MAP:FF (s)MAP:BP (s)REDUCE (s)Comm. (s)Total (s)
(6, 1, 1, 2) 0.40 0.36 0.05 0.47 1.28
(6, 2, 2, 2) 0.44 0.43 0.04 0.52 1.43
(16, 2, 2, 8) 0.48 0.42 0.03 0.54 1.47
(16, 4, 4, 8) 0.47 0.45 0.04 0.51 1.47
(32, 8, 8, 8) 0.57 0.50 0.04 0.45 1.56
(32, 16, 16, 8) 0.55 0.52 0.03 0.47 1.57
(64, 8, 8, 8) 0.55 0.50 0.04 0.45 1.54
(64, 32, 32, 8) 0.55 0.62 0.04 0.43 1.64
(128, 32, 32, 8) 0.60 0.63 0.04 0.38 1.65
(128, 64, 64, 8) 0.78 0.80 0.05 0.56 2.19
(256, 64, 64, 8) 1.04 1.36 0.06 0.38 2.84
(256, 128, 128, 8) 2.01 2.62 0.11 0.61 5.35
TABLE VI: Execution times per-global-iteration of various NN architectures with batch sizeB=120,N=10 parties.MAP:FF,MAP:BP, Comm. stand
forMAP:feed-forward,MAP: backpropagation, and communication respectively.
We note that PREPARE stands for the offline phase and it incorporates the collective generation of the encryption, decryption, evaluation,
and rotation keys based on the protocols presented in [82]. Most of the time and bandwidth are consumed by the generation of the rotation
keys needed for the training protocol.
Functionality Execution time (s) Comm. (MB)
ASigmoid/
ASmoothRelu
0.050 -
ASigmoidD/
ASmoothReluD
0.022 -
Square 0.01 -
ASoftmax 0.07 -
SquareD 0.006 -
DBootstrap 0.09 6.5
DBootstrappALT (log2(h) rots) 0.18 6.5
DBootstrappALT with Average Pool 0.33 6.5
FC layer 0.09 -
CV layer 0.03 -
DKeySwitch 0.07 23.13
PREPARE (offline) 18.19 3.8k
MAP (only communication) 0.03 18.35
COMBINE 0.09 7.8
REDUCE 0.08 13
TABLE VII:Microbenchmarks of different functionalities forN=10 parties, d=32, h=64,N=213, da=3.
B. Benchmarks on Various Neural Network Topologies
We provide execution times of different network topologies in Table VI. “Topology” represents number of features (d), hidden neurons in
each layer (h1,h2), and number of output labels (h3) as (d,h1,h2,h3). We use local batch size b=12 and global batch sizeB=120 forN=10
parties. We use ASigmoid with da=3 as an activation function. The execution times indicate the time required for one global iteration, i.e.,
a processing of the global batch, and we report forward pass, backpropagation and the number of communications in separate columns. The
“Communication” column includes the communication required for the COMBINE phase and for DBootstrap(·) operations. We provide the
feed-forward and backpropagation times in MAP separately.
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Topology Execution Time (s)
(256,CV [2×2],P [2×2],FC[16:2]) 1.42
(512,CV [2×2],P [2×2],FC[16:2]) 1.52
(512,CV [2×2],P [2×2],FC[32:2]) 1.88
(784,CV [2×2],P [2×2],FC[32:2]) 2.12
(784,CV [2×2],P [2×2],FC[32:10]) 2.56
(784,CV [2×2],P [2×2],CV [2×2],P [2×2],FC[32:10]) 3.88
TABLE VIII: Execution times per-global-iteration of various CNN architectures, with batch sizeB=120,N=10 parties.
C. Benchmarks on Various Convolutional Neural Network Topologies
We provide extrapolated execution times of different CNN topologies in Table VIII. As we introduce several operations (derivative of pooling)
in the forward pass to bootstrapping function, we do not separate between forward pass and backpropagation times, and we introduce the
overall execution times. “Topology” represents the padded (power-of-two) number of features (d), kernel size for CV layer (CV [n×n]),
kernel size for average pooling layer (P [n×n]), and h number of neurons in the last FC layer connected to h` output layers (FC[h :h`]) as
(d,CV [n×n],P [n×n],FC[h :h`]).
APPENDIX I
EXTENSIONS
We introduce here several security, learning, and optimization extensions that can be integrated to POSEIDON.
A. Security Extensions
We provide several security extensions that can be integrated to POSEIDON as a future work.
Active Adversaries: POSEIDON preserves the privacy of the parties under a passive-adversary model with up to N−1 colluding parties,
motivated by the cooperative federated learning scenario presented in Sections I and IV-A. If applied to other different scenarios, our work could
be extended to an active-adversarial setting by using standard verifiable computation techniques, e.g., resorting to zero-knowledge proofs and
redundant computation. This would, though, come at the cost of an increase in the computational complexity, that will be analyzed as future work.
Out-of-the-Scope Attacks: We briefly discuss here out-of-the-scope attacks and countermeasures. By maintaining the intermediate values
of the learning process and the final model weights under encryption, during the training process, we protect data and model confidentiality.
As such, POSEIDON protects against federated learning attacks [84], [76], [53], [117], [111]. Nonetheless, there exist inference attacks that
target the outputs of the model’s predictions, e.g., membership inference [100], model inversion [40], or model stealing [105]. Such attacks
can be mitigated via complementary countermeasures that can be easily integrated to POSEIDON: (i) limiting the number of prediction queries
for the queriers, and (ii) adding noise to the prediction’s output to achieve differential privacy guarantees. The choice of the differential privacy
parameters in this setting remains an interesting open problem.
B. Learning Extensions
Early Stop. There are several techniques proposed for the early stopping of the training of a neural network. They also prevent over-fitting
as described and evaluated by Prechelt [92]. These approaches are: (i) GLα: stop when the generalization loss exceeds a certain threshold α,
(ii) PQα: stop when the quotient of generalization loss and progress exceeds a certain threshold α, and (iii) UPs: stop when the generalization
error increased in s successive strips. The generalization error is estimated by the error on a validation set. We note that these methods can
be seamlessly integrated into POSEIDON by dividing each party’s data into training and validation sets. Depending on the threshold and the
method, the privacy-preserving implementation would require the homomorphic aggregation of the generalization error evaluated on each Pi’s
validation set and a collective decryption of the error, after a number of global iterations t. As the error is the averaged scalar value. The leakage
from the loss remains negligible when there are sufficient validation samples.
Availability, Data Distribution, and Asynchronous Distributed Neural Networks. In this work, we rely on a multiparty cryptographic
scheme that assumes that the parties are always available. We here note that POSEIDON can support asynchronous distributed neural network
training [36] without waiting for all parties to send the local gradients. As such, a time threshold could be used for updating the global model.
However, we note that the collective cryptographic protocols require that all the parties be available (e.g.,DBootstrap(·) andDBootstrapALT(·)).
Changing POSEIDON’s distributed bootstrapping with a centralized one that achieves a practical security level would require increasing the
size of the ciphertexts and result in a huge computation and communication overhead.
For the evaluation of POSEIDON, we evenly distribute the dataset across the parties; we consider the effects of uneven distributions or the
asynchronous SGD to the model accuracy — which are studied in the literature [67], [36], [110] — orthogonal to this work. However, a
preliminary analysis with the MNIST dataset and the NN structure defined in our evaluation (see Section VII) shows that asynchronous learning
decreases the model accuracy between 1 and 4% when we assume that a server is down with a failure probability between 0.4 and 0.8, i.e.,
when there is between 40 and 80% chance of not receiving the local gradients from a server in a global iteration. Finally, we find that the uneven
distribution of the MNIST dataset forN=10 parties with one party holding 90% of the data results to a 6% decrease in the model accuracy.
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C. Optimization Extensions
Optimizations for Convolutional Neural Networks. We present a scheme for applying the convolutions on the slots, similar to FC layers, by
representing them with a matrix multiplication. Convolution on a matrix, however, can be performed with a simple polynomial multiplication by
using the coefficients of the polynomial. This operation requires a Fast-Fourier Transform (FFT) from slots (Number Theoretic Transform (NTT))
to coefficients domain, and vice versa (inverseFFT) for switching between CV to pooling or FC layers. Although it achieves better performance
for CV layers, domain-switching is expensive. In the case of multiple CV layers before an FC layer, this operation could be embedded into
the distributed bootstrapping (DBootstrapALT(·)) for efficiency. The evaluation of the trade-off between the two solutions for larger matrix
dimensions is an interesting direction for future work.
Graphics Processing Units (GPUs). In this work, we evaluate our system on CPUs. Using GPUs to improve POSEIDON’s performance requires
GPU-compatible cryptographic functions, i.e., extending the underlying cryptographic library Lattigo [77]. In a recent work, Badawi et al. [15]
proposed the first GPU implementation of the full RNS-variant of the CKKS scheme, for which they report speedups of one to two orders
of magnitude over a CPU implementation. Hence, GPU-accelerated FHE is an option that could greatly improve the practicality of POSEIDON.
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